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STUDENT COMMENTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE RISE AND FALL OF PRIVITY
INTRODUCTION
The story of warranty as a theory of products liability has a theme
which brings to mind the typical Horatio Alger "success story." Warranty
had uncertain beginnings in early English law as a tort that was not quite
a tort, and as an equally dubious assumpsit.l . Throughout its early develop-
ment it was considered both a tort and an assumpsit and the plaintiff was
allowed to declare under either form of action. 2 As the decades passed, the
assumpsit form became the more prevalent and warranty emerged as a con-
tractual concepts and privity of contract was a necessity for recovery for
breach of warranty.4 Thus, a person harmed by a product could recover for
breach of warranty only from his immediate vendor. Although this may
have been adequate during the period preceding the industrial revolution,
it proved inadequate when industry expanded to a point where manufacturer
and consumer, while at remote ends of a long and complex chain of distribu-
tion, were brought together as a theoretical buyer and seller by modern
advertising and marketing practices. Implied warranty became an impotent
theory of recovery by the unbending requirement of privity.
This comment is directed at the methods employed by many United
States courts to circumvent privity requirements: the forging of exceptions,
creation of legal fictions and the complete abandonment of privity, each
reflecting gradual recognition of the dynamic needs of twentieth century
marketing practices.
NATURE OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
Products liability is concerned with two types of implied warranties.
These are the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty
of fitness.° A precise definition of merchantability is difficult. Generally,
goods are of merchantable quality if they are goods of the general kind
which were described when bought, or if they are reasonably suited for the
ordinary purposes for which they were manufactured.° Thus, when a product
is defective and the defect causes injury to the buyer, the goods are con-
1 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1888) ; 1 Williston, Sales
195 (rev. ed. 1948).
2 Stuart V. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778).
3
 Ames, supra note 1, at 9.
4 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1848).
5 The Uniform Sales Act classifies these two warranties as follows: "(1) Where
the buyer, expressly or by implication makes known to the seller the particular purpose
for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgement (whether he be grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purposes. (2) Where the goods are bought
by description from seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality." U.S.A. § 15.
6 l Williston, supra note 1, § 243.
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sidered below the minimum standards of merchantability which is a breach
of the implied warranty.?
The Uniform Commercial Code is more precise in its definition of an
implied warranty of merchantability. 8 The Code refers to such concepts
as "fair average quality . . . fit for ordinary purposes . . . adequately con-
tained, packaged, and labeled ... conform to the promises or affirmations
made on the container or label." 8 These standards are, more or less, a
codification of some of the prior case law.
An implied warranty of fitness is imposed when the goods are purchased
for a particular purpose and, under the Sales Act, 1° when the purchaser
makes the seller aware of the purpose and relies upon the seller's skill and
judgment in selecting suitable goods. The Uniform Commercial Code
relaxes this notice requirement of the Sales Act. 7 ' If the above require-
ments are met, and a defect in the goods causes injury to the purchaser,
then the goods do not fit the purpose for which they were purchased and
there is a breach of the implied warranty. 12
Thus, implied warranties, as now codified and under the common law,"
declare a public policy imposing strict liability upon a seller of goods for
injuries caused by defects in his product." However, neither the Uniform
Sales Act nor the Uniform Commercial Code expressly affect the privity
rule as it applies to manufacturers and consumers.
The Uniform Sales Act does not definitely require that there be privity
of contract as a pre-requisite to recovery on an implied warranty; 15 how-
ever, it constantly refers to warranties running in favor of a "buyer." The
Sales Act defines "buyer" as "a person who buys or agrees to buy goods
or any legal successor in interest of such person.'" (Emphasis added.) Al-
though the language "legal successor in interest" might be construed as
eliminating privity of contract, no court has done so. Thus, the Sales Act
has left this question to be decided by the courts of the several states.
The Uniform Commercial Code has eliminated members of the buyer's
household, his family and guests from the technical privity rules." Al-
though Section 2-318 codifies the rule that has been prevalent in several
jurisdictions," it represents a significant upheaval in the law of a state
7 Ibid.
8 UCC § 2-314.
9
 Ibid.
10 Supra note 5.
11 UCC § 2-315.
12
 1 Williston, supra note 1, § 235.
13 Jones v. Just, [18681 3 Q.B. 197.
14 Prosser, Torts 494 (2d ed. 1955).
15
 U.S.A. § 15.
18 U.S.A. § 76.
17 UCC	 2-318 states: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a •
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
18 Infra notes 30, 31 and 32.
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such as Massachusetts'° where privity is retained with all its vestiges of
yesteryear. However, the Commercial Code does not solve the basic prob-
lem presented by this comment. Section 2-318 has no effect at all upon
the warranty liability of a manufacturer to a consumer. The official com-
ment to Section 2-318 states:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provi-
sions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond
this the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict
the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties given to
his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distribution
chain to
Thus, neither the Commercial Code nor the Sales Act have significant
effect upon the most important aspect of privity in products liability.
Acceptance or rejection of privity as a basis for implied warranty recovery
is still a matter for the courts of the individual jurisdictions.
At least one state by statute has completely abandoned the privity
requirement in warranty actions against the manufacturer. The Georgia
legislature has imposed a warranty of fitness and merchantability upon a
manufacturer when his product is sold as new to a consumer. 21 They have
relieved the Georgia courts of the struggle now being waged in so many
jurisdictions of the United States.
PRIVITY
The concept of privity of contract has plagued the field of products
liability for over a century. In 1848 Lord Abinger said in a case involving
an alleged breach of warranty by the manufacturer of a coach subsequently
leased to the plaintiff's employer:
Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as to the parties
who entered them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences,
to which I can see no limit, would ensue. 22
In 1916, after a long period of application of the rule to actions in both
warranty and negligence, 23 Justice Cardozo retaliated, at least in the latter
action:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing
of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be ex-
pected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
caref u Ily . 24
12 The Uniform Commercial Code has been effective in Massachusetts since
October, 1958.
20 UCC § 2-318.
21 Ga. Code Ann. § 96-307 (1958).
22 Winterbottom v. Wright, supra note 4, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (Sth Cir. 1903).
24 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
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While the majority of courts have followed Cardozo's lead in negli-
gence cases,25 they long refused to yield in breach of warranty actions in
spite of the difficult problem of proving that a manufacturer was negli-
gent.25 The preVailing view in the United States is that privity of contract
is still necessary in implied warranty actions. 27 The theory behind this
strict privity requirement dates back to the contractual nature of a warranty
as declared in Winterbottom v. Wright. 28
WHEN IS THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT SATISFIED?
There are, of course, instances where several courts which generally
follow the privity rule have allowed recovery on an implied warranty with-
out direct privity. In these cases the existence of a special relationship
extends privity to reach third parties. Thus, privity of contract has been
established where the party to the contract of sale is the agent of the injured
party; 2° where a guest was injured by a product purchased by his host; 5°
25 Prosser, supra note 14, at 500. The MacPherson doctrine has even been
accepted in Massachusetts where privity has enjoyed many years of reverence. Carter
v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
26 Proof of negligence in products liability cases is a very difficult problem, Since
it is virtually impossible for the plaintiff to obtain and present direct evidence of
negligence, the manufacturer's negligence must be proved by employing the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. In order to apply this doctrine certain preliminary findings must
be made. Among these findings are that the accident must be of the type where the
negligence of someone is usually the cause. Also, the causing agency or instrumentality
must be within the exclusive control of the defendant. Prosser, supra note 14, at 207.
In addition, the prevailing view is that res ipsa loquitur merely creates an inference
of negligence. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn. L. Rev.
241 (1936).
27 Sterchi Bros. Stores v. Castleberry, 28 Ala. App. 281, 182 So. 471 (1937),
rev'd on other grounds, 236 Ala. 349, 182 So. 474 (1938); Crystal Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955); Borucki v. Mackenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn.
92, 3 A.2d 224 (1938) ; Berni v. Kutner, 76 A.2d 801 (Del. 1950) ; Studebaker Corp.
v. Nail, 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E.2d 198 (1950); Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement
Co., 35 Idaho 231, 205 Pac. 1118 (1922); Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10
Il1.2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 75 (1956) (express warranty) ; Caplinger v. Werner, 311 S.W.2d
201 (Ky. 1958) ; Strother v. Villere Coal Co., 15 So.2d 383 (La. 1943) ; Pelletier v.
Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925) ; Kennedy v. Brockelman Brothers, Inc.,
334 Mass. 225, 134 N.E.2d 747 (1956) ; Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somera Planting Co.,
130 Miss. 147, 93 So. 673 (1922) (express warranty) ; Finks v. Viking Refrigerators,
235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1940); Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co., 276 N.Y.
172, 11 N.E,2d 718 (1937) ; Marler v. Pearlman's R.R. Salvage Co., 230 N.C. 121,
52 S.E.2d 3 (1949); Wood v. Advance Rum ley Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 284, 234 N.W. 517
(1931); Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., 340 P.2d 181 (Ore. 1959); Lombardi v.
California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955); Odom v. Ford Motor
Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956); Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.
1955) ; H. M. Gleason & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 197 Va. 255, 88 S.E.2d
904 (1955) ; Williams v. S. H. Kress & Co., 48 Wash.2d 88, 291 P.2d 662 (1955);
Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952).
28 Supra note 4.
29 Jaquot v. William Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass, 312, 149 N,E.2d 635 (1959);
Brussels v. Grand Union Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 751, 187 Ad. 582 (1936).
• 30 Conklin v. Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc.2d 496, 161 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1957);
see UCC 2-318.
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where a wife acted as her husband's agent in purchasing the goods in ques-
tion ; 31
 where there is a parent-child relationship ; 32
 and where an employee
is injured by a product purchased for him by his employer."
RELAXATION OF PRIVITY—LEGAL FICTIONS
Attempts have been made by several courts to soften the blow that
privity has dealt to the injured consumer by a series of legal fictions, One
writer has listed no less than twenty-nine of these fictions built up through
the years ranging from theories of agency and third party beneficiary to
construction of the Uniform Sales Act.34 Notable among these are that
the retailer is the consumer's agent to buy or the manufacturer's agent to
sell; that a warranty "runs with the goods" from the manufacturer to the
consumer; and that the manufacturer's warranty to the retailer "inures to
the consumer's benefit." But the exertions employed by the courts to arrive
at these fictions actually do not solve the basic problem but merely bring a
particular fact situation within the bounds of privity."
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVITY RULE
Some courts have abandoned, for the most part, the use of legal fictions
to avoid the harsh operation of the privity rule. They have established
instead various public policy exceptions to its application. Perhaps the most
frequent exception is in the case of injury due to impure food. A significant
number of courts have imposed strict liability upon the manufacturer of
the "deleterious and unwholesome" foodstuffs on the basis of an implied
warranty.36
 In the leading case of Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,"
the Texas court voiced the rule that the non-negligent manufacturer who
processes and sells food to a retailer for resale for human consumption is
31
 Young v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (D.C. Pa.
1936).
82 Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943).
33
 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960).
34
 Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153 (1958).
35
 There is nothing wrong with fictions, if they work. The test is purely prag-
matic. Any one of these approaches might work, but none of them is pre-
eminent or logically unassailable, and none of them squarely faces the real issue:
as a matter of economic policy, should the manufacturer be liable without fault
to the consumer? .. . The policy decision should be faced and made, and, if
absoluate liability is found to be called for, it should be imposed directly,
without fiction or analogy.
Id. at 155.
36
 Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957) ;
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Ca1.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954) ; Tiffin v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 111.2d 48, 162 N,E.2d 406 (1959) ; Anderson v. Tyler,
223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937) ; Cernes v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
183 Kan. 758, 332 P.2d 258 (1958) ; Miller v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
70 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1954) ; Armour & Co. v. McMillain, 171 Miss. 199, 155
So. 218 (1934) ; Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo.
1959) ; Ada Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Asbury, 206 Okla. 269, 242 P.2d 417 (1952) ;
Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 AtI. 537 (1931);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ; La Hue v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wash.2d 645, 314. 421 (1957).
37 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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liable to the consumer for injuries resulting from eating the food. Liability
was based upon an implied warranty. The court reasoned:
Liability in such case is not based on negligence, not on breach of
the usual implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle
of public policy to protect human health and life. It is a well known
fact that articles of food are manufactured and placed in the chan-
nels of commerce, with the intention that they shall pass from hand
to hand until they are finally used by some remote consumer. It
is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate con-
sumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not it is suitable
for human consumption. . . It seems to be the rule that where
food products sold for human consumption are unfit for that pur-
pose there is such an utter failure of the purpose for which the food
is sold, and the consequences of eating unsound food are so disas-
trous to human health and life, that the law imposes a warranty of
purity in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public
policy. 38
It is questionable, however, whether this public policy consideration,
and the reasoning behind it, can validly be restricted to impure foodstuffs.
Public policy can also support recovery for defective mechanical instruments
which also can cause dire injury to the consumer. If the criteria is degree
of harm caused by the defective product, it is submitted that many mechani-
cal and utilitarian products are on a parallel with foodstuffs. 39 Although
the Decker rationale is an important breakthrough in the law of products
liability, it has yet to affect the view of the courts in die-hard privity states. 4°
Another rather limited exception is where injury to the consumer is
caused by a defect in the container holding the food.'" The theory behind
this exception is directly related to that of impure foods liability and,
indeed, the two are close. The Uniform Commercial Code, while not estab-
lishing this container test as an exception to the privity rule, does make
a sound container one of the minimum standards of merchantability. 42 In
38
 Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
33
 This never has been, I repeat, and is not now, a question of food and drink.
It is a question of commodities, moderately or greatly standardized, put out for
and upon consumers who have not the skill to judge them, save in use. It is
significant of our over-case-lawing and neglect of basic trends that we con pro-
duce articles and books on "Food" which do not perceive that belladonna-for-
dandelion means wheels, guns, breaking ropes, untested safety valves, unsafe
charged bottles, quite as well as trichinae in pork, tacks in cake, or legally estab-
lished mice or cigar-butts in some popular soft drink. Only when the responsi-
bility of an auto manufacturer is placed beside that of the canner of peas or of
the baking company whose Mother's Pie ornaments the billboards, will this
general problem become clear, in either meaning or solution. And the distrib-
uting machinery will then come in for legal overhauling, in the teeth of
"contract".
Lewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341, 408 (1937).
40
 Karger v. Armour & Co., 19 F. Supp. 484 (D.C. Mass. 1936) ; Chysky v.
Drake Bros., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
41 Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
42 ijCC § 2-314 (2)(e).
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the light of this criteria, it follows that injury due to a defective container
is a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. 4 ' Usually someone
other than the immediate seller has supplied the container. A further
extension of the impure food exception is the imposition of liability without
privity in the case of injury due to contaminated animal food. 44 Thus, in
certain areas the cow has reached a higher rung on the ladder of products
liability than has the injured motorist.
REJECTION OF THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
In recent years the trend has been towards a complete departure from
privity. This trend represents a major upheaval in present-day products
liability theory. It recognizes that a sale of goods in 1961 differs from a
corresponding sale in 1861. It imposes strict liability upon a manufacturer
because the manufacturer, through intensive advertising, has represented to
the consumer that its product is pure or harmless. Thus, if the consumer
relies on these advertisements, purchases the product from a third party,
and while using it is injured, the manufacturer has been held liable on an
express warranty." In 1958, Justice Skeel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
enunciated this theory in the now famous case of Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co." where the court, in an exhaustive opinion which reviewed
the history of products liability and the role that warranty plays in today's
high pressure distributive processes, held the manufacturer liable on an
express warranty because of the representations of the defendant in its
advertisements extolling the safety features of its hair waving preparation.
As Justice Skeel reasoned:
The warranties made by the manufacturer in his advertisements and
by the labels on his products are inducements to the ultimate con-
sumer, and the manufacturer ought to be held to strict accounta-
bility to any consumer who buys the product in reliance on such
representations and later suffers injury because the product proves
to be defective or deleterious. 47
43 Quaere whether the manufacturer should be liable for injury due to a
defective container after he has relinquished control of this container and it has
passed through the hands of a retailer?
44 McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Stipp. 5 (D.C. Cal. 1954).
45
 The Uniform Sales Act § 12 defines an express warranty as:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is
an express warranty .
 if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise
is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the
goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any
statement purporting to be a. statement of the seller's opinion only shall be
construed as a warranty.
The Uniform Commercial Code, while changing the wording of the Sales Act,
retains its basic theme in § 2-313.
4° 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 75 A.L.R.2d 103 (1958),
41 Id. at 249, 147 N.E.2d at 615, 75 A.L.R.2d at 108. UCC § 2-314(f) also sets down
as a requirement for merchantability that the product conform to the promises or affirma-
tions on the labels. This can have significant impact on the law of products liability.
In jurisdictions where privity is no longer required, manufacturers will put claims on
their packages at the risk of absolute liability for untruthfulness.
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The holding in the Rogers case had a significant impact on products
liability in Ohio. Shortly thereafter, its principle was even further extended
to include implied warranties of fitness. 48
 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has recognized the Rogers case as representing the total
rejection of the privity requirement in both express and implied warranty
cases." It viewed Rogers not as a mere exception to the privity rule, but
rather as a new theory of products liability which should not be confined
to its facts.
Several courts have found both express warranty liability based on the
defendant's advertisements and implied warranty liability in the same case.
Thus, as recently as October of 1961, the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors, in Haman v. Digliani, 5° abandoned the requirement of privity of
contract and held a manufacturer of a household detergent liable for injuries
incurred by a consumer using the product. In reference to the express
warranty the court said:
Where the manufacturer or producer makes representations in his
advertisements or by the labels on his products as inducement to
the ultimate purchaser, the manufacturer or producer should be
held to strict accountability to any person who buys the product
in reliance on the representations and later suffers injury beCause
the product fails to conform to them. . . . Lack of privity is not a
bar to suit under these circumstances."
In imposing liability on an implied warranty the court stated that:
The manufacturer or producer who puts a commodity for personal
use on the market in a sealed package or other closed container
should be held to have impliedly warranted to the ultimate con-
sumer that the product is reasonably fit for the purpose intended
and that it does not contain any harmful and deleterious ingredients
of which due and ample warning has not been given. 52
This is implied warranty of fitness language. Thus, the Connecticut court
is readily finding liability under either of the two warranties. After a charge
based on the above language a jury would have little difficulty in finding
some basis for the defendant's liability.
A rather startling example of how far a court will go in extending this
advertising liability is presented in the recent case of Pritchard v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Company 55
 where the plaintiff sued the defendant cigarette
manufacturer for negligence and breach of warranty. The plaintiff claimed
that cancer of his right lung was caused by smoking Chesterfield cigarettes.
Reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the Court of Appeals held
that due to the extensive advertising of the defendant as to the safety of
48 Markovitch v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d
181 (1958).
49 Arfons v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1958).
60 174 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1961).
51 Id. at 297-98.
52 Id. at 297.
5a 295 F.2d 292 (3rd Cir. 1961).
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Chesterfields," a jury could have found that there was a breach of an ex-
press warranty by the defendant as well as breach of implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability. However, Judge Goodrich, in a concurring
opinion, was unwilling to expand this unique fact situation to implied
warranty liability. He limited the liability to an express warranty based
upon advertising of the defendant, noting the peculiar type of product in-
volved and making an analogy to the unlikeliness of imposing implied war-
ranty liability upon a whiskey producer for injury to an over-indulging
consumer."
The current trend towards total rejection of privity in warranty is
similar to the early effect of the MacPherson case in negligence cases. Four
recent cases involve liability due to defects in an automobile. In Pennsyl-
vania, Jarnot v. Ford Motor Company" held a truck manufacturer liable
on an implied warranty for damage caused by a defective kingpin, with-
out any privity between the parties. Later, New Jersey followed suit in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc." where the court, in an exhaustive
and comprehensive opinion, rejected privity as a requirement for recovery
on an implied warranty and permitted the plaintiff to recover from an auto-
mobile manufacturer for injuries resulting from defects in the automobile.
The court delved extensively into modern marketing practices replete with
pressure advertising and concluded that privity of contract is unsuitable to
those conditions and is merely a vestige of a bygone era" of direct channels
of distribution where the vendee had ample opportunity to check the validity
of a manufacturer's claims."
The recent case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
v. Anderson-Weber, Inc." adopts the rule of Henningsen, and also refers
to the Tennessee case of General Motors Corporation v. Dodson 61 which
brought that state into the allegedly enlightened fold.
As in MacPherson, the rule is not limited to automobiles but neither
is it restricted to a negligence cause of action. Kansas seems also to have
54
 A good cigarette can cause no ills and cure no ailments . . . but it gives you
a lot of pleasure, peace of mind and comfort. Nose, throat and accessory
organs not adversely affected by smoking Chesterfield.
Id. at 297.
55 Id. at 302 (concurring opinion).
55
 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); and see Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F.
Supp. 120 (F.D. Pa. 1961).
57 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960). Cf. Kaspirowitz v. Schering
Corp., 175 A.2d 658 (N.J. Super. 1961),
58 For an interesting article in which the author considers today's practice of
imposing strict liability upon the manufacturer a revival of medieval ecclesiastical law,
see Murphy, Medieval Theory and Products Liability, 3 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L.
Rev. 29 (1961).
59 Under modern marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a new
automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public,
an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies
it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency between the
•manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra note 57, at 84, 75 A.L,R.2d at 20.
60 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961).
61 338 S,W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
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repudiated the privity rule in light of Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc. 02 where
plaintiff recovered for injuries from defendant distributor of hair prepara-
tions on a breach of warranty theory even though there was no privity
between the parties. The language in this case refers to a "public policy
exception" to the privity rule. However, B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond"
explicitly states that privity is no longer a requirement in Kansas since
implied warranty is based on public policy.
In imposing these implied warranties of merchantability and fitness,
courts very often do not make a distinction between the two but apply them
both to a given case." Often this is due to confusion as to the require-
ments of each; however, there are certain circumstances where both war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability can be applied. 05 It is entirety con-
ceivable that goods which are not fit for a given purpose may also fail to
conform to the minimum standards of merchantability. In such a case, both
theories of recovery may overlap each other. This overlapping liability is
candidly illustrated in the Pritchard case where the defendant was held
accountable under both implied warranties and an express warranty.
CONCLUSION
The preceding cases illustrate how a growing number of jurisdictions
have accepted the challenge presented by present-day marketing and ad-
vertising procedures and have abandoned the shackles of stare decisis. Privity
of contract is no longer suitable in our expanded economy. Modern ad-
vertisements tell the consumer that he is buying a perfect product, free
from defects and dangers. Impossible claims are made by the "ad men"
without any thought as to the consequences. This situation should be
rectified. If it means that a manufacturer is to be held as an insurer of its
product, then so it must be. These half truths and vague statements are a
fraud upon the American consumer and if the consumer relies on them and
is thereby injured, recovery should come from the party actually responsible,
not the retailer who had no control over the ingredients of a product in a
sealed package but the one who made it and induced its sale. Thus, the
poor soul with a mouthful of tooth decay should be able to recover from
the toothpaste manufacturer who tells him that he need brush only once a
day. And a person dying of lung cancer should be able to hold the cigarette
manufacturer liable for his condition when this manufacturer tells him not
to worry about such things.
With the high incidence of lung cancer in this country among cigarette
smokers, many "cancer cases" can be expected in the future. The plaintiffs
will rely heavily on the Pritchard holding. However, it is likely that the
defendants will stress Judge Goodrich's concurring opinion in an attempt to
narrow the impact of this case as much as possible.
82 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
63 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959) ; see Note, 1 B.C. Ind. and Comm. L. Rev.
268 (1960).
64 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., supra note 53; Hamon v. Digliani,
supra note 50.
65 1 Williston, supra note 1, 235.
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STUDENT COMMENTS
With the abandonment of privity, products liability is embarking upon
a new era. The courts now will succeed where the regulatory agencies have
failed. Madison Avenue will no longer have a free hand but will make these
representations at their peril. The American consumer will finally be recog-
nized as a person who deserves the full protection of the law. And the
manufacturer will no longer be permitted to find shelter from responsibility
under ancient doctrines such as privity of contract and caveat emptor.
MORTON R. COVITZ
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